Universalism and junk by Cotnoir, A.J.
Universalism and Junk
.  . 
Abstract
ose who accept the necessity of mereological universalism face what has come to be
known as the ‘junk argument’ due to Bohn () and Schaﬀer (), which proceeds from
(i) the incompatibility of junk with universalism and (ii) the possibility of junk, to conclude
that mereological universalism isn’t metaphysically necessary. Most attention has focused
on (ii); however recent authors have cast doubt on (i). is paper undertakes a defense of
premise (i) against three main objections. e ﬁrst is a new objection to the eﬀect that Bohn’s
() defence of it presupposes far too much. In particular, Bohn’s suppositions entail mere-
ological extensionalism. I show that one can defend premise (i) from a much weaker set of
assumptions. Hence variants of the junk argument can be shown to apply to non-extensional
mereological systems as well. e second objection due to Contessa () is that those who
accept unrestricted composition should only accept the existence of binary sums (which are
compatible with junk) rather than inﬁnitary fusions. I argue this conception of unrestricted
composition is problematic: it is in conﬂict with an intuitive remainder principle. e ﬁnal
objection is due to Spencer (). Spencer’s view is that there is no absolutely unrestricted
plural universal quantiﬁer. So, any statement of the unrestricted fusion axiom will simply not
rule out the existence of junky worlds. I argue that the failure of unrestricted quantiﬁcation
will not be enough by itself to establish the existence of junk. And furthermore, it is not clear
whether this view counts as a form of mereological universalism. As a result, I suggest that if
one wants to reject the junk argument, premise (ii) is the only viable option.
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Universalism is the view that composition is unrestricted; that is, for any things whatsoever,
there is a whole composed of them. A number of philosophers maintain that universalism is
true, indeed that it is metaphysically necessary.¹ But universalism is one of the most controversial
doctrines of classical mereology. A standard objection is that universalism commits us to too
many composite objects, including gerrymandered objects composed of say, the Eiﬀel Tower and
the tip of your nose. ese are not objects recognised in our common sense conception of the
world.
Amore recent objection, however, contends that universalism commits us to too few composite
objects. It requires parthood chains to ‘top out’ at some largest object. But must there be such a
largest object? Why couldn’t it be that for every composed whole, there is another that contains it?
An argument has been put forward that undermines the view that universalism is metaphysically
necessary; the argument appeals to the possibility of junky worlds. Junky worlds (introduced by
Schaﬀer []) are worlds where everything in that world is a proper part of something.² e junk
argument, due to Bohn [, , ], proceeds as follows:
(i) If universalism necessarily true, then there can be no junky worlds.
(ii) Junky worlds are metaphysically possible.
(iii) erefore, universalism is either metaphysically contingent or necessarily false.
Much attention has been devoted to premise (ii). Bohn [] contends that junky worlds satisfy
three criteria for metaphysical possibility: conceivability, advocacy, and consistency.
But if we can conceive of junky worlds, and several prominent philosophers have
taken the idea seriously, and there are no logical contradictions lurking, then we are
hard pressed to deny the mere possibility of the world being junky. ([, p. ])
¹Lewis [] Rea [], Sider [], Varzi [], van Cleve [], and many more.
²is is the converse of the notion of a gunky world in which everything in that world has something as a proper
part.
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e case for conceivability involves thought experiments: one might imagine for example that
a universe just like ours is contained as a particle in some much larger replica universe, which
is itself merely a particle in another replica universe, and so on. Such a world would be junky.
Leibniz [] and Whitehead [] both held that the actual world is junky.³ Moreover, there are
clearly formal models of junky mereologies, as we shall see below, and so the idea is logically
consistent.
Schaﬀer [, p. ] by contrast, thinks that junk is inconceivable; conceiving of a world as a
world requires it to be viewed as a totality, or a whole. And any world that contained junk would
be an entity that isn’t a proper part of anything, per impossible. Watson [] also takes up the
case against conceivability by objecting to the speciﬁc thought experiments proposed. For the
record, I do not think Bohn’s three criteria are suﬃcient for (or even provide good evidence for)
metaphysical possibility, but the matter is too complicated for discussion here.
In any case, I do not wish to challenge the case for premise (ii). More recently premise (i)
has come under ﬁre. Contessa [] and Spencer [] have each provided independent reasons
that ‘universalists’ should dispatch the junk argument by rejecting premise (i). In this paper, I
undertake a defence of premise (i) against a variety of objections.
In §, I put forward a new objection to Bohn’s defence of premise (i) — that it is not available
to proponents of non-classical mereologies. In §§– I generalise the defence of premise (i) to
hold in virtually any merelogy and based on virtually any deﬁnition of mereological fusion. I
address unsupplemented mereologies in § which explicitly reject Bohn’s key assumption. In § I
address mutual parts mereologists, who might accept counterfeit junk that satisﬁes the deﬁnition
in letter, but not in spirit. A slight revision in the deﬁnition of junk reestablishes premise (i) (or a
mild variant thereof ). In § I defend premise (i) against Contessa’s objection; and in §, I defend
it against Spencer’s objection.
ese defences of premise (i) show that it is particularly resilient and can be based on extremely
minimal assumptions. e upshot, then, is that anyone who wants to reject the junk argument
³See Bohn [, p. ] and Simons [, p. ] for relevant quotations.
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must do so by rejecting premise (ii) instead.
 Extensionality & Junk
In his argument for premise (i), Bohn relies on the following mereological assumption, where <
is proper parthood,  is parthood (‘x  y’ is deﬁned as ‘x < y _ x = y’), and  is mereological
overlap (‘x  y’ is deﬁned as ‘9z(z  x^ z  y)’).
Weak Supplementation x < y! 9z(z < y^ :z  x)
Weak supplementation says that if something has a proper part, it must have another part disjoint
from the ﬁrst. Recall, a junky world is one in which everything is a proper part of something:
Junk 8x9y(x < y)
Bohn’s argument for premise (i) is as follows:
[A]ssume universalism is true in all possible worlds and that some possible world w
is junky. en universalism is true in w. Consider the plurality of everything there
is in w, call it aa. By universal instantiation, 9y(aa compose y); by existential instan-
tiation, aa compose U. By deﬁnition [of junk], it is true in w that 8x9y(x < y).
By universal instantiation, 9y(U < y). But U is composed of everything in w, and
hence, by deﬁnition [of composition], everything in w is a part of it, including itself.
But then nothing can have U as a proper part, because if so, by [weak] supplementa-
tion, there would be something that shares no part with U, and hence is not a part
of U, which contradicts that everything is a part of U. So, if some possible world is
junky, then universalism is not necessarily true. Q.E.D. ([, p. , fn ])
Now, the principle used in the argument is admittedly fairly plausible. Indeed, Bohn regards the
weak supplementation principle as analytic of proper parthood.
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I assume at least some mereological principles without existential import are ana-
lytically true, and in virtue of that are necessarily true too. […] Minimal Exten-
sional Mereology is a minimum of mereological necessary truths. is system includes
(among other things) the asymmetry and transitivity of proper parthood, as well as a
weak supplementation principle. ([], )
Plausible, but far from uncontroversial. I do not think weak supplementation is analytic, but I
appreciate more needs to be said.⁴ In fact, as we will see below, there is a growing number of
mereologists who reject weak supplementation. Some reject weak supplementation on its own
terms, ﬁnding it independently objectionable.⁵ Others reject weak supplementation because they
reject either irreﬂexivity⁶ and asymmetry⁷, which (in combination with transitivity) can be derived
from weak supplementation.
Transitivity (x < y^ y < z) ! x < z
Irreﬂexivity x 6< x
Asymmetry x < y! y 6< x
Many of the reasons given for rejecting irreﬂexivity and asymmetry concern exotic counterexam-
ples, of which one might be suspicious. But there is a more philosophically robust reason enough
to generalise the junk argument: it turns out that these ‘minimal’ principles are suﬃcient, when
combined with unrestricted composition, to yield perhaps the most controversial mereological
principle of all — extensionality, which says that composite objects with the same proper parts
are identical.⁸ Extensionality forces us to identify objects, like perhaps the statue and the clay it
is made from, which have all their parts in common. Given the indiscernibility of identicals, this
⁴For some considerations in this direction, see Cotnoir [].
⁵Proponents include: Donnelly [], Forrest [], and Smith []. Also see Caplan et. al. [] who express sympathy
for the view.
⁶Proponents of dropping irreﬂexivity include Cotnoir and Bacon [], Kearns [], and Kleinschmidt [].
⁷Proponents of dropping asymmetry (or antisymmetry for parthood) for extensionality-independent reasons include
Cotnoir and Bacon [], Kleinschmidt [], Sanford [], and Tillman and Fowler [].
⁸See Varzi [] to get a ﬂavour of the debate.
 | .  . 
entails that any two composed objects with all the same proper parts have all the same properties.
And whether e.g. the statue and the clay are indiscernible is a matter of serious contention.
e argument that universalists who accept weak supplementation and transitivity are com-
mitted to extensionality is due to Varzi []. Informally, imagine you had a counterexample to
extensionality; suppose a statue s and its clay c are distinct objects with the same proper parts.
By asymmetry, s 6< c, and c 6< s.⁹ By unrestricted fusion, there must be a sum s+ c. (Note:
s+ c 6= s since c  s+ c but c  s; likewise s+ c 6= c, since s  s+ c but s  c). Now, s < s+ c;
however, there is no proper part of s+ c that is disjoint from s, as any proper part of c is also a
proper part of s by supposition. is violates weak supplementation. Hence, there can be no such
counterexample to extensionality.
ere are two ways to avoid Varzi’s argument; as a result, there are two main approaches to
mereology without extensionality: the unsupplemented view,¹⁰ and the mutual parts view.¹¹ Both
of these approaches are compatible with unrestricted composition; indeed, many proponents of
these views themselves accept it. Since each explicitly rejects Bohn’s assumption of weak sup-
plementation, Bohn’s defence of premise (i) is not available to them. But there are defences of
premise (i) that non-classical mereologists can (and should) accept. I provide such defences in the
next two sections for virtually any mereology with virtually any conception of unrestricted fusion.
 Weak Supplementation & Junk
e ﬁrst main non-extensionalist option is the unsupplemented approach which drops the weak
supplementation axiom above, but adds asymmetry. e unsupplemented approach has access to
a well-developed mereology that includes unrestricted fusion. Here is a candidate list of axioms.
Asymmetry x < y! y 6< x
⁹For, suppose c < s. Asymmetry implies s 6< c. Hence, s and c are not a counterexample to extensionality. Mutatis
mutandis for the supposition that s < c.
¹⁰For extensionality-based reasons to drop weak supplementation, see Simons [] and Gilmore[].
¹¹For reasons to drop asymmetry to secure anti-extensionalism, see omson [, ] and Cotnoir [].
 | .  . 
Transitivity (x < y^ y < z) ! x < z
Unrestricted Composition 8xx9yF(y, xx).
Fusions appearing in the unrestricted composition axiom are deﬁned as follows.
Fusion F(t, xx) iﬀ xx  t^ 8y(y  t! y  xx))
(I write ‘xx  t’ to mean that every x that is among xx is part of t, and ‘y  xx’ to mean that y
overlaps some x among the xx.)
On this view, proper parthood is a strict partial order; the major change is that weak supple-
mentation is explicitly rejected. Some unsupplemented mereologists simply drop the axiom and
leave it at that.¹² Others (primarily Gilmore []) have suggested a replacement axiom to cap-
ture the intuition behind weak supplementation without risk of extensionality.¹³ But as Bohn’s
defence of premise (i) explicitly appeals to weak supplementation, this defense is not available to
unsupplemented anti-extensionalists, many of whom do accept unrestricted composition.
ere is, however, a straightforward argument from transitivity and asymmetry (in place of
weak supplementation) that unrestricted composition entails the negation of junk. Let xx range
over absolutely everything in a world. Since composition is unrestricted, there is some u such that
F(u, xx). As such, we have xx  u (by the deﬁnition of fusion). Now, to satisfy the deﬁnition of
junk, suppose u < uˆ. By asymmetry, uˆ 6< u, and thus uˆ  u. But that contradicts the supposition
that xx contains absolutely everything. So, there is no such uˆ, and hence the world is not junky.
None of this depends on any supplementation whatsoever. As a result, a version of the junk
argument applies to unsupplemented anti-extensionalism.
¹²See the proponents listed in footnote  for the case for conceivability. It is also clear the approach is consistent
(the axioms are satisﬁed in any complete lattice; for quasi-supplementation, consider complete join semi-lattices with
at least two distinct minimal elements). So by Bohn’s own criteria, the approach would appear to be metaphysically
possible. It should at least be regarded as an available position in logical space.
¹³e relevant axiom is:
Quasi-Supplementation x < y! 9w9z(z  y^ w  y^ :z  w)
However this addition is strictly optional; there is a defense of premise (i) that goes through without it.
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Now, there is some debate over the correct notion of fusion for anti-extensionalists. In fact,
some have held that the deﬁnition above is inadequate.¹⁴ However, it is worth noting that the
above argument only relies on the fact that the fusion of xx has each of the xx as a part. Surely,
any adequate notion of mereological fusion must be such that it is an upper bound in this sense
of the things it fuses (even if not a least upper bound). at is, one cannot think t is the fusion
of the cats if some cat fails to be part of t. But then the above argument applies to unrestricted
fusion of any sort.
 Asymmetry & Junk
e second option for anti-extensionalists is the mutual parts view which rejects asymmetry for
proper parthood. is allows for two distinct objects, such as the statue and the clay, to be parts
of each other. As it turns out, this is suﬃcient for avoiding extensionality principles of all sorts.¹⁵
is approach has a growing number of advocates.¹⁶
e following axioms give a precise characterisation of the mutual parts approach.
Transitivity (x < y^ y < z) ! x < z
Remainder y  x! 9z8w(w  z$ (w  y^ :w  x))
Unrestricted Composition 8xx9yF(y, xx).¹⁷
As above, weak supplementation entails asymmetry, and so the mutual parts view must reject
weak supplementation. However, the mutual parts view has access to a variety of very strong sup-
¹⁴See for example the arguments in Varzi [] and Cotnoir [].
¹⁵See Cotnoir [] for an examination of the relation between antisymmetry and extensionality.
¹⁶Proponents of dropping antisymmetry (listed in footnote ) have access to a well-developed mereology (which
includes unrestricted fusion) with a class of well-deﬁnedmodels (see [, ] for details). us, the approach is consistent.
It appears the approach satisﬁes Bohn’s own criteria for possibility. At least very least, then, dropping asymmetry should
be worthy of serious consideration.
¹⁷A variant weaker deﬁnition of fusion is typically used here:
F(t, xx) iﬀ xx  t^ 8y(xx  y! t  y)
However, the weakness of this deﬁnition is made up for by the corresponding strength of the remainder principle. (See
[], §. for more details).
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plementation principles. e strongest of these is the remainder principle, which says that if y fails
to be part of x, then there is an object composed of all and only the non-x-overlapping parts of y
— x’s complement in y.¹⁸ It is commonly thought that strong supplementation principles like the
remainder principle entail weak supplementation; but the proof of this fact relies on asymmetry.
So the mutual parts view can accept such strong principles without falling into extensionality.¹⁹
is principle is again optional; however, we will return to this principle below (§). But even in
the presence of unrestricted fusion, this approach does not fall prey to the junk argument. ere
are models of this mereology that also satisfy Bohn’s deﬁnition of junk, stating that everything is
a proper part.
One such example is given by considering an a and b that are mutual parts such that everything
else in the world is part of both. Such a world is consistent with unrestricted fusion, since a and
b both count as fusions of the other. As is evident, a and b are distinct, so in fact there are two
universal objects. Now, is this a junky world? In a sense, yes, since a < b, a has everything as a
proper part, but is itself a proper part of something (namely, of b). Likewise, since b < a, b is
has everything as a part but is itself a proper part of something (namely, a). So, according to the
letter of the current deﬁnition of junk, premise (i) is strictly speaking false.
However, the kind of ‘junk’ displayed above is not the sort of junk one has in mind when
levelling the argument against opponents of unrestricted composition. Proponents of junk are
arguing for the existence of certain metaphysical structures; they are not (at least not primarily)
arguing for the existence of worlds that satisfy a particular formal deﬁnition. As is often the case
when one moves between formal systems, sometimes deﬁnitions that previously captured the
intended structures fail to do so in a certain setting.²⁰ Which deﬁnition captures the intended
junky structures in the non-asymmetric setting? I contend that it is junk:
Junk* 8x9y(x < y^ y  x)
¹⁸Simons [, p. ] is responsible for the name. Varzi [] and Hovda [] call it Complementation.
¹⁹For more details, see Cotnoir [].
²⁰Compare the discussion regarding the correct deﬁnition of fusion (Varzi [] and Cotnoir []) or the correct
deﬁnition of proper parthood (Cotnoir [], and Rea []) in non-extensional settings.
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So, a junky world is a world in which everything is a proper part of something that is not also
one of its own parts. In other words, junk guarantees that everything is a non-mutual proper
part (i.e. not a proper part of one of its proper parts, nor a proper part of itself ). is sort of junk
is incompatible with the above mereology. If u is the fusion of everything xx, then xx  u. Now,
to satisfy the deﬁnition of junk, suppose u < uˆ and uˆ  u. Contradiction.
is shows that premise (i) of the junk argument (on the intended reading, anyway) does not
rely on any assumption of asymmetry.
 Binary Sums & Junk
I have been using ‘Universalism’ in the usual way to mean that whenever you have some things,
there is a fusion of them. Contessa [] distinguishes between strong and weak versions of univer-
salism.
Strong Universalism For any plurality xx, there is an object that is their fusion.²¹
Weak Universalism For any pair of objects x and y, there is an object that is their fusion.
Contessa contends that those who accept universalism should accept only the weak version and
reject the strong. So for him, mereological universalists ought to accept only the existence of
binary sums, and reject inﬁnitary fusions.
To be clear about the context of this response, it is important to note that the junk argument
was clearly originally intended as an objection to the strong version of the thesis. In fact, no one
who calls herself a universalist accepts the weak thesis but not the strong. So, a natural reply
springs to mind: the weak thesis isn’t really a form of mereological universalism at all, is it? Of
course it is compatible with universalism, as anyone who accepts the strong thesis would also
²¹It should be noted that Bohn [] states the thesis as follows: “at is, assume that necessarily, any collection of
things composes something” (p. ). Likewise, Contessa states the strong thesis as follows: “for any collection of
objects, there is always an object that is their mereological sum” (p. ). But, given the connection between the
notions of collection and set, we should be clear that it is only non-empty collections that have fusions; virtually no
universalist thinks that the empty set has a fusion.
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accept the weak. But insofar as one accepts the weak thesis while rejecting the strong thesis, that
view rejects the existence of certain kinds of fusions — it accepts that composition holds only
in some cases (the ﬁnitary ones) and rejects that it holds under all cases (which would include
the inﬁnitary ones). For what it is worth, when Bohn [] originally gives the junk argument, he
considers such a view calling it explicitly a ‘restricted view of composition’.
Contessa considers this thought and writes,
However, according to weak mereological universalism, that should not be under-
stood as a restriction on composition, for, according to weak mereological universal-
ism, mereological composition would be restricted only if there were pairs of objects
that, under some circumstances, did not have a mereological sum and, since junky
worlds do not feature any such pair of objects, they do not constitute a counterex-
ample to weak mereological universalism. ([], p. )
It is not clear from the passage precisely what Contessa has in mind here as a dialectically eﬀective
reply. e statement that “composition would be restricted only if there were pairs of objects
that […] did not have a mereological sum” suggests the idea that composition is fundamentally
a binary operation, not properly thought of as an operation on collections.²² A related thought
is that composition is essentially binary — the composition operation by its very nature takes
two objects as inputs and outputs some further object. On that understanding of composition,
weak universalists do think composition is unrestricted. Inﬁnitary cases of compositions are no
counterexample to universalism because inﬁnitary collections of objects aren’t even ‘composition-
apt ’. Composition doesn’t fail to obtain, it fails to apply.
ere are a number of reasons one might ﬁnd this strict version of weak universalism unsatisfy-
ing. Let me ﬁrst consider a bad reason for rejecting it before going on to present my own preferred
reasons. Bohn [] objects to this view by arguing that it is incompatible with the existence of gunky
worlds — worlds in which everything has a proper part. Bohn claims:
²²Contessa has conﬁrmed in correspondence that this is in fact the view he had in mind.
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at means that if the world is ﬁnite, it contains a universal object U, while if the
world is inﬁnite with mereological atoms, it is junky. e problem with this principle
is that it is incompatible with the world being gunky. A gunky world is such that
everything in it has a proper part. If everything in the world has a proper part,
then every fusion in the world is inﬁnitely divisible, which means that every fusion in
the world is of inﬁnite cardinality, which again means that no fusion in the world is of
ﬁnite cardinality. Since our principle implies that necessarily all fusions are of ﬁnite
cardinality, it must therefore be incompatible with the possibility of gunk. ([, p.
], emphasis mine)
ere two things to say about this argument. First, it is true that a gunky object a would be a case
of inﬁnitary fusion. Let aa be the plurality of all the proper parts of the gunky object a. en aa
is an inﬁnite collection such that F(a, aa). Must the weak universalist reject the existence of such
an object? I think the answer is ‘no’. A weak universalist might accept the existence of a so long
as there exist some proper parts a1 and a2, such that their sum just is a. e problem with Bohn’s
argument is with the emphasised portion of the passage. Just because the world is inﬁnite (and
indeed, every object inﬁnitely divisible), it does not follow that every fusion must be inﬁnite.
While gunky objects have inﬁnitely descending proper parthood chains, the key issue is whether
there are inﬁnitely ascending chains leading up to the gunky object. e weak universalist might
accept the possible existence of objects with inﬁnitely many proper parts, so long as we can always
fuse our way up to it in ﬁnitely-many steps.²³
So Bohn’s objection to the weak thesis fails. However, there is another argument against this
particular essentialist version of weak universalism: it is in tension with an important mereological
principle — the remainder principle above. Recall:
²³Consider a non-junky but gunky model M; in particular, suppose M has no inﬁnite ascending <-chains, but has
inﬁnite descending <-chains. It follows that for every non-empty subset A ofM, there is some ﬁnite subset F of A such
that the least upper bound of F is the least upper bound of A. (For a proof of this fact, see Davey and Priestly [, p.
], eorem .(i).) Since we can take all the members of F and fuse them pair-wise, it follows that every non-empty
subset A has a fusion.
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Remainder y  x! 9z8w(w  z$ (w  y^ :w  x))
e principle entails that where y is has a proper part x, there must be a ‘remainder’ or ‘comple-
ment’ of x in y. e remainder z has as parts all and only the non-x-overlapping parts of y. But the
non-x-overlapping parts of y might well be inﬁnite. And it turns out (by the deﬁnition of fusion)
that z is the fusion of precisely these parts. To see this, ﬁx some particular x and y, such that z is this
remainder. Let ww be the plurality of objects satisfying the open sentence ‘(w  y^:w  x)’. To
establish that F(z,ww) we need to show that ww  z and 8w(w  z ! w  ww)). e former
we have by the right-to-left direction of the consequent of the remainder principle. For the latter,
suppose w  z. en by the left-to-right direction of the consequent, we have it that w is such
that (w  y ^ :w  x)), which means by deﬁnition it is identical to one of the ww, and hence
overlaps one of them. us the remainder principle entails that z is the fusion of ww.
e weak universalist cannot simply stipulate the remainder principle as an axiom without
running the risk of thereby accepting inﬁnitary fusions. Now it may well be in some cases (as in
the case of gunk without inﬁnite ascending <-chains above), that z can be constructed pair-wise
from other objects. But the weak universalist who rejects purely inﬁnite fusions needs it to be the
case that every remainder can be constructed in this way from ﬁnite sums. However, there is no
general guarantee that this is the case; there is nothing in the axioms of her mereology that rule
out structures for which remainders cannot be so constructed. Problematic cases involve worlds
with inﬁnite ascending proper parthood chains up to some composed whole — call them non-
Noetherian worlds.²⁴ Such worlds come in a number of varieties: worlds which are both junky
and gunky (i.e. what Bohn [] calls ‘hunky’) can be of this type, as are worlds where the proper
parthood chain is dense, i.e. for every x and z such that x < z, there is some y such that x < y < z.
For a concrete example of the latter, suppose we have an object q be the interval of rational
numbers between 0 and 1 (inclusive). Now focus on the ‘right half ’ r of q, namely the interval of
²⁴Let M0 be a model of a non-Noetherian world. Since such a world has inﬁnite ascending <-chains, we can no
longer prove that every non-empty subset A of M0 has a corresponding ﬁnite subset F such that the least upper bound
of F is the least upper bound A. is may be (in the case of junk) because A has no upper bound at all inM0, or it may
be that even though A has a least upper bound, the only way to fuse to A is by taking the fusion of all of its members.
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numbers between and including 12 and 1. Since [0, 1]  [
1
2 , 1], by the remainder principle, there
must be some object l (the ‘left half ’) composed of all and only those parts of [0, 1] that do not
overlap [12 , 1]. So it must contain every number starting from 0 and up to (but not including)
1
2 ,
namely the interval [0, 12). Notice, because of the density of the rationals, there is no last number
in this interval. So if we are trying to generate it by composing it pairwise with other rational
numbers, we will fail. For every object we sum up, there will always be inﬁnitely many more. We
would have a ﬁnite sum up to r if there were certain open intervals around, but these are precisely
what we don’t know to exist. And it’s not clear there is any way of ensuring they exist without
also committing one to inﬁnitary fusions.
ere are a few avenues of reply: one might (a) reject the remainder principle, (b) reject the
existence of non-Noetherian worlds (i.e. reject the possibility of hunky worlds or dense worlds),
or (c) accept both, and allow some cases of inﬁnitary composition. Against (a), I would urge that
the remainder principle is an important part of classical mereology; it is what makes mereology a
Boolean algebra after all. e resulting mereology would be highly non-classical in ways unrelated
to the existence of junk.²⁵ Against (b), it would be very odd (even if not incoherent) if in defending
the possibility of inﬁnite ascent of one type — namely, junky worlds — one was forced into
denying the possibility of inﬁnite ascent of another type — namely, hunky or dense worlds. Why
should it be the case that any world with proper parthood chains that continue inﬁnitely upward
cannot have any proper parthood chains that also continue inﬁnitely up to a whole? Absent some
principled metaphysical reason, it is a dialectically weak position to ﬁnd oneself defending, at any
rate.²⁶ Moreover, given that many philosophers think that regions of space are continuous, and
hence dense, option (b) rules out a very common view about the structure of the actual world.
So I think the best option is (c). In fact, this is the view of the only mereologists (that I know
of ) who accept the weak thesis but not the strong thesis. For example, Bostock’s [, ch.  §]
mereology was devised for the foundations of arithmetic in the rational numbers; as such, his
²⁵For more discussion, see Hovda [], especially footnote .
²⁶See also the arguments in Bohn [, §].
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mereology is quite robust. It allows for gunk and junk and dense proper parthood chains, and
also satisﬁes the remainder principle. e main departure from classical mereology that Bostock
proposes is a variant fusion axiom, which (in our notation) is:
Moderately Unrestricted Composition 8xx(9y(xx  y) ! 9zF(z, xx))²⁷
What this principle says is that if xx have an upper bound, then they must have a fusion. Of
course, this entails that if some inﬁnite collection is bounded from above, then it must have a
fusion. is is compatible with the existence of junk, though, since not all inﬁnite collections
are required to be bounded from above. However, it is not compatible with the strict essentialist
version weak universalist thesis, since it entails that some inﬁnite collections have fusions.²⁸
Moreoever, ‘moderately unrestricted’ composition makes it plain that the view is not really a
version of mereological universalism at all. e fusion axiom is plainly restricted by the antecedent
— only collections that are bounded have fusions. And so, I view this response as changing the
terms of the debate. It may well be the most plausible version of a junky mereology, but it hardly
constitutes a counterinstance to premise (i).
 Unrestricted Quantiﬁcation & Junk
Spencer [] has recently argued against premise (i) due to the fact that its defence relies on
unrestricted plural quantiﬁcation.²⁹ at is, the incompatibility of junk and unrestricted compo-
sition requires the supposition that there are some things xx — call them ‘all things’ — such that
everything is amongst them.
²⁷e deﬁnition of fusion is diﬀerent from above. For Bostock [, p. ], fusion is deﬁned thus: F0(t, xx) iﬀ
8y(y  t$ y  xx), although in the presence of the remainder principle, the two deﬁnitions are equivalent.
²⁸For a sophisticated discussion of related issues, see Linnebo, Hellman, and Shapiro’s [] mereological conception
of the Aristotelian continuum. ey openly admit that their view is not a universalist view (as such, none of the
arguments of this paper are aimed at them), but do wish to avoid actual inﬁnities insofar as it is possible. e main
diﬃculties involve securing the existence of diﬀerences (i.e. remainders), bisections, and biextensions, as well as proving
the Archimedian principle. ey propose a number of diﬀerent fusion axioms to attempt to deal with the diﬃculties.
²⁹is is related to Bohn’s explicit claim that “Universalism [is deﬁned as] 8xx9y(xx compose y), where the quantiﬁers
are unrestricted and ‘xx’ is a plural variable taking one or more things as its value” ([, p. ]).
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[T]his argument clearly relies on the premise that there are some things that all things
are amongst. If there are no such things, then the argument is unsound. In fact,
unrestricted composition and [the denial of ‘all things’] together entail junk. ([,
p. ])
While this approach is the best attempt at avoiding premise (i), it is less than clear that the mere
denial of ‘all things’ will deliver the compossibility of unrestricted composition and junky worlds
in the required sense.
Before delving into Spencer’s arguments, we need to be clear on what it is that Spencer is
rejecting. We need to distinguish between (a) absolutely unrestricted singular quantiﬁcation and
absolutely unrestricted plural quantiﬁcation, and (b) two diﬀerent readings of what it is for a
plural quantiﬁer to be absolutely unrestricted.
For (a), there is an important diﬀerence between absolutely unrestricted singular quantiﬁca-
tion and absolutely unrestricted plural quantiﬁcation. e former is used in the deﬁnition of
junk, while the latter is used in the fusion axiom. Spencer is clear that he is not denying that the
singular universal quantiﬁer is absolutely unrestricted. But one might deny this, and we should
consider whether that might aﬀect premise (i) of the junk argument. So let us suppose that our
singular universal quantiﬁer fails to be unrestricted. Notice that junky worlds are themselves de-
ﬁned using the universal quantiﬁer. So, if our universal quantiﬁer fails to quantify over everything,
it may well be that those objects not in its scope will fail to have a fusion. However, even if so
it will not follow that the world satisﬁes the deﬁnition of being junky, since it will not follow
that 8x9y(x < y) is true. Why? Because those objects that fall outside the scope of the unre-
stricted fusion axiom will also fall outside the scope of the quantiﬁer in the statement of junk.
All that could be maintained in this case, is the might be worlds that are inexpressibly junky. But
the metaphysical possibility of inexpressibly junky worlds has not been argued for. It needs an
independent defence — a defence that goes well beyond the defence of premise (ii).
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Returning to (b), we need to clarify what is at issue in claiming that a plural quantiﬁer is
unrestricted. ere are two possible ways of thinking about this. First, we might think a plural
quantiﬁer is unrestricted if and only if it ranges over absolutely everything; that is, for every thing
x, there is some plurality xx that x is among. On this reading, Spencer is deﬁnitely not arguing
against unrestricted plural quantiﬁcation.
However, there is a second way of thinking about what it is for a plural quantiﬁer to be unre-
stricted: it is unrestricted if and only if it ranges over absolutely all pluralities, where pluralities
are generated from all the instances of plural comprehension. On this reading, Spencer is arguing
against unrestricted plural quantiﬁcation, since he rejects that there is a plurality of all things.
To be precise, Spencer expresses the denial of ‘all things’ thus: :9xx8yy(yy are among xx). He
has to deny plural comprehension, since were zz to contain all and only the objects satisfying the
predicate 9x(z = x), it would consist of ‘all things’.
Now we are in a position to consider Spencer’s argument against premise (i).³⁰ Spencer’s
argument purports to show that a world in which universalism is true and without ‘all things’
must be a junky world.
Consider some arbitrary thing ‘Chunk’ and call all of its parts ‘Bits’. Now if [the exis-
tence of ‘all things’] is false, there are some things that Chunk’s parts are properly amongst.
Call those things ‘Bits+Pieces’. Now, there are some things amongst Bits+Pieces that
are not parts of Chunk […] [namely,] Pieces. According to unrestricted composition
there is something composed of Chunk and Pieces, namely Big Chunk. Moreover
since Big Chunk has parts that are not parts of Chunk, namely Pieces, it follows
that Chunk is a proper part of Big Chunk. So, there is something that Chunk is a
proper part of. But, since Chunk was arbitrarily chosen, it follows that for anything
whatsoever, there is something that it is a proper part of. So Junk is true. Again,
unrestricted composition and [the denial of ‘all things’] entails Junk. ( [, p. ])
³⁰I focus only on his second (more general) argument. What I say about the second applies equally to the ﬁrst.
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e argument has a number of moving parts; however, we do not have to read very far to ﬁnd
some potentially objectionable assumptions being made. e emphasised passage contains two
such assumptions. e ﬁrst is that for any arbitrary thing, there is a plurality of all its parts (in
this case, ‘Bits’). e second assumption claims that if there is no plurality of all things, then
there must be a plurality that properly contains all of the parts of a given thing (in this case,
‘Bits+Pieces’). But why think either assumption is true? I will consider each in turn.
Regarding the ﬁrst assumption, here is a possible scenario. Suppose we can quantify over every
macro-level object but we cannot quantify over all their parts. It may well be that the world gets
‘too numerous’ as we move to more and more ﬁnely grained levels of reality. We may be simply
unable to quantify over all things because we cannot quantify over all the parts of things.
If we can quantify over objects at some macro-level speciﬁcation, by unrestricted fusion (of
any sort), we will have it that every parthood chain has an upper bound. Hence, we know that
the world has at least one<-maximal element (an element with nothing containing it as a proper
part).³¹ But a maximal element entails the failure of junk. For a concrete example, imagine the
domain of all subsets of the [0, 1] interval of the real numbers. Imagine that pluralities can take
at most countably many subsets of that interval. Let yy be the plurality containing two intervals:
[0, 12 ] and [
1
2 , 1]. e fusion of yy is the whole unit, even though there is no plurality of all subsets
of the unit.
It is worth noting that Spencer recognises that his argument relies on this assumption, and
suggests that its failure would be an “interesting metaphysical result” (). Still, such a possibility
shows that a universalist who rejects unrestricted plural quantiﬁcation is not committed to junk.
What is required, then, is an argument for thinking that our quantiﬁer fails to quantify over
absolutely everything going upwards along parthood chains, rather than the failure occurring as
³¹is requires an application of Zorn’s Lemma, which is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice.
Zorn’s Lemma Let M be any non-empty partially ordered set. If every chain has an upper bound, then M has a
maximal element.
Suppose M here is a model of the mereological structure of the world, and the partial order on M is just the parthood
relation. A chain is deﬁned to be a totally ordered subset of M; so, a subset such that for every x and y, either x  y or
y  x.
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we go downwards. What we need in short is an argument in favour of premise (ii) of the junk
argument.
ere is a second assumption in Spencer’s argument: the denial of all things entails that for
any plurality, there must be another plurality that properly contains it. Presumably, what Spencer
is thinking is this: suppose aa are some things and that there is no plurality that properly contains
aa. en aa would be a plurality of everything, which we are supposing does not exist. But
this does not follow, as aa might just be the largest plurality we can quantify over. As such, the
assumption is entirely unwarranted in the context.
To make the matter concrete, let us give a metaphysical example. Suppose there are too many
mereological simples to quantify over. In that case, we couldn’t quantify over all things because
we couldn’t quantify over all the smallest things. If there are too many simples to form a plurality,
those simples might not be parts of anything due to the corresponding expressive weakness of
the unrestricted composition axiom. Still, each individual simple will be an upper bound of the
(trivial) chain containing only itself. Every other chain will have an upper bound by unrestricted
fusion. Hence, we will have a maximal element of the world — in this case, perhaps lots!³² But
the existence of such maximal elements means that the world cannot be a junky world. Note well:
this is all perfectly compatible with the failure of the universal quantiﬁer to be absolutely general.
Again what are not given, and what is required for the argument, is a reason to think that for
any plurality, there is always amore expansive plurality containing it, i.e. 8xx9yy(xx are properly among yy).
is is strikingly close to the assumption of junk, i.e. 8x9y(x < y).³³ e best way forward, I
think, would motivate the failure of unrestricted plural quantiﬁcation via indeﬁnite extensibility.
at is, whenever we have ‘all things’ at one level, we can construct some new thing which has all
previous things as proper parts. So, at each level n in the construction, there is some further thing
at level n+ 1 which failed to be quantiﬁed over at level n. is typed approach is seen clearly by
³²Again, this follows by an application of Zorn’s Lemma.
³³Where  is the symbol for the plural ‘are among’ relation, the denial of ‘all things’ is logically equivalent to
8xx9yy(yy 6 xx). is is structurally analogous to something entailed by the deﬁnition of junk, but which does not
itself entail junk: namely 8x9y(y  x).
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indexing our quantiﬁers. us, a kind of ‘junk’ becomes expressible:
Typed Junk 8nx9n+1y(x < y)
Likewise, the corresponding version of ‘unrestricted’ composition becomes:
Typed Composition 8nxx9n+1yF(y, xx)
On this view, junk is compatible with typed composition. However, one should immediately
begin to wonder whether this typed version of composition is really unrestricted after all. How
are we supposed to admit that our quantiﬁers fail to be unrestricted, and yet accept that com-
position is unrestricted if they exhibit the very same phenomena? We might say that junk is still
incompatible with absolutely unrestricted composition; and reword premise (i) accordingly.
Of course, the reply will come: but there is no such thing as absolutely unrestricted compo-
sition — some variant of our typed composition is the best anyone can do! I am not sure how to
adjudicate this debate over whether something counts as ‘unrestricted’ or not. e issues are too
complex to delve into here. But I’ll just note that if the reply is correct, then it depends on the
arguments for the metaphysical possibility of indeﬁnite extensibility, and the corresponding sort
of junk generated from it. And so it still seems to me to boil down to a case of requiring a robust
defence of premise (ii).
 Concluding Remarks
I have argued that the junk argument can be modiﬁed to apply to virtually any mereology —
extensional or not — that accepts unrestricted composition of any sort. I’ve shown that the
retreat the the weak version of mereological universalism is not a promising move. It either
requires more widescale revisions to mereological structure, or is explicitly a form of restricted
composition. Moreover, I have argued that rejecting absolutely general quantiﬁcation does not
(at least by itself ) ensure the possibility junky worlds. One might allow for inexpressible gunk,
but this option goes well beyond anything that premise (ii) provides. Or if one expresses junk
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and composition via type restrictions, then it’s unclear that the view really does represent a form
of unrestricted mereological composition. I conclude that premise (i) of the junk argument is
undefeated. e case against universalism rests entirely on premise (ii).³⁴
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